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Abstract 
 
The Foundations of a Nation:  
 
Framing Pakistan from 1940-1971 through  
International Relations Theory and Postcolonialism 
 
Joshua Charles Orme, MA/MGPS 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Supervisor: Syed A Hyder 
 
This paper explores the emerging integration of international relations theory with 
postcolonial scholarship and uses Pakistan’s state formation and history as a case study. It 
is argued that international relations theory privileges European experiences and history, 
which results in inaccurate assumptions about the outcomes of colonialism and origins of 
postcolonial independence. Pakistan’s unique development as a state founded on 
ideology and build out of an imperial/colonial system offers an opportunity for 
destabilizing Eurocentrism in international studies. Rather than favoring a singular 
outcome or conclusion, this paper demonstrates the plurality necessary for an inclusive 
historical analysis of state-power. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This report attempts to engage with existing discourse on International Relations 
(IR) Theory in the context of both postcolonial theoretical critiques and the geopolitical 
realities of a postcolonial world. IR theory can extend its depth with useful insights from 
new inter-disciplinary intersections with history, anthropology, sociology, and even 
comparative literature. Many of these fields have seen significant intellectual expansion 
from postcolonial, feminist, or Marxist critiques. Similarly, IR theory is being expanded 
through timely criticism and alternative methodology stemming from the aforementioned 
intellectual spaces. IR theory has long been associated with a specifically North 
American academic model but, as global institutions (from the “non-West”) and a more 
diverse body of theorists and practioners enter the discipline, there has been an insistence 
on new forms of IR that allow for more inclusive approaches and more contextual 
understanding of world history and international relations.  
In this vein, I will explore Pakistan’s specific history as a nation-state particularly 
the colonial legacy, anti-colonial aspirations, and postcolonial linkages that intermingle in 
the process of Pakistan’s state formation. This analysis of Pakistan’s position as a 
postcolonial state is not intended to develop a comprehensive theory of state identity. 
Additionally, there is no objective in this report to see the experience of Pakistan forced 
entirely into existing IR theoretical frameworks. Rather, Pakistan’s process of state-
formation between 1940 (when it was clearly conceptualized) to 1971 (when it was 
divided into two independent states) will function as an example of evaluating statehood 
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within a framework of IR theory that is sympathetic to postcolonialism’s intellectual 
contributions to the wider academic community.  
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Chapter 2: International Relations Theory in a Postcolonial Framework 
EUROCENTRICISM IN IR THEORY AND IMPLICATIONS 
In IR theory, the state is the central building-block for analysis. Students of 
international relations have, for decades, envisioned the world in terms of great powers, 
the balancing and “bandwagon-ing” of coalitions, and the threats of rising powers along 
with a plethora of further jargon and concepts. Much of these models and theories come 
to us today in the intellectual and historical traditions of Western Europe and the 
academic institutions of the United States. Historically, the court of Versailles, the Treaty 
of Westphalia, and the Enlightenment are privileged as the hegemonic basis for invoking 
the nation-state and IR.1 Similarly, it is the American foreign policy experience of the 
20th century that dominates the discipline’s additional focus. IR maintains a subsequently 
normative Eurocentrism that universalizes and elevates Western history above the 
experience of the rest of the world.2 As a result, there is movement within the discipline 
to intentionally develop a more inclusive approach to IR.  
Amitav Acharya provides a notable alternative that, while acknowledging colonial 
and Eurocentric linkages with IR, does not take a view that existing theories are 
inherently invalid.3 Rather, he points to the need for IR to struggle more with potential 
blind spots and gaps. For instance, otherwise parsimonious theories do not question the 
                                                 
1Navid Pourmokhtari, “A Postcolonial Critique of State Sovereignty in IR: The Contradictory legacy of a 
‘West-Centric’ Discipline”. Third World Quarterly 34:10, (2013) 1767-1793.  
2Kamran Matin. “Redeeming the universal: Postcolonialism and the inner life of Eurocentrism”. European 
Journal of International Relations, 2011. 
3Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds”. International Studies 
Quarterly 58, no.4 (2014): 647-659 
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nature of the state in serious ways or identify sufficiently the impact of global interactions 
such as colonialism. With deeper consideration for such issues, national interests, the 
parlance of decision-making for international relations, may take on a less ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach. Acharya’s specific model is identified as “Global IR”, which he describes 
as a “project [that] transcends the distinction between West and non-West” and as an 
“aspiration for greater inclusiveness and diversity in [the] discipline.”4 Global IR would 
in this context challenge the exceptionalism accorded to European/Western states and the 
universalizing norm of agency singularly embedded in the state.  
A particular feature of note in IR theory challenged by a “Global IR” is the use of 
history within IR. This can be approached on two levels – first, there is a narrative in IR 
based on a Hobbesian logic of the relationship between individual and the state that 
describes power in a non-historical way; and second, there is a question of selective 
attention to historical events placing European experience superior to a more global 
understanding. On the former point, Sanjay Seth describes IR’s relationship with history 
as “unimportant if the defining feature of the international order is considered to be the 
transhistorical fact of anarchy.”5 While this reading of IR’s interaction with history may 
be somewhat hyperbolic, the perspective of IR does establish a normative view of history 
on an international-political level that is fairly static. In addition, this leads to selectivity 
in reading history for IR’s purposes - perhaps most dramatically captured by the attention 
given to the Treaty of Westphalia. This historical event takes a prime place in IR as the 
                                                 
4Archaya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds,” 649 
5Sanjay Seth, “Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations.” Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 40(1), (2011)167–183. DOI: 10.1177/0305829811412325 
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moment in which state sovereignty is permanently affixed and subsequently normalized 
under imperial colonialism.6 More broadly, there is an emphasis placed on European 
historical events as exemplars and the determinate case studies. For example, the French 
Revolution figures as a predominate case for Enlightenment values and expanding 
democratization. Yet the coterminous Haitian Revolution is typically ignored despite its 
unprecedented success as a slave revolt.7 In more classical historical examples, the 
Roman Empire’s control of the Mediterranean becomes the norm of hegemonic power 
rather than the less coercive Indian Ocean trade and tributary system.8 To rectify these 
exclusions, IR needs to incorporate historical understanding from a broader set of sources 
in order to achieve a more global perspective.  
An additional implication of the Eurocentric nature of IR is the possibility of 
questioning and destabilizing the normative nature of the state. This is particularly true 
when considering the historical reality of colonialism as undercutting the sanctity of state 
sovereignty upheld in IR.9 IR’s concept of the modern state is inextricably linked with 
state development in Western Europe predicated by the capacity provided through 
colonialism. Post-World War II, this continuation of statehood norms places the plethora 
of new states who achieved independence at constant inferiority to Western counterparts 
despite their obvious disadvantage and exploitation. These states further did have the 
opportunity to subsequently develop a colonial network for their own capital 
                                                 
6Pourmokhtari, “A Postcolonial Critique of State Sovereignty in IR,” 1782  
7Zeynep Gulsah Capan, “Decolonising International Relations”, Third World Quarterly 38:1 (2017): 1-15. 
doi: 10.1080/01436597.2016.1245100 
8Archarya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds,” 653. 
9Pourmokhtari, “A Postcolonial Critique of State Sovereignty in IR,” 1767. 
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development. A Global IR theory should be able to both engage with the state as a unit of 
analysis and destabilize IR’s assumptions about state-power particularly in a postcolonial 
context.    
ADDING POSTCOLONIAL THEORY TO IR 
 
The intellectual work for a “Global IR” has been set a significant foundation in 
postcolonial theory, which is also known as postcolonialism. Postcolonial in this 
theoretical space should not be confused with merely the chronological and historical 
moment of official cessation of colonial territory holding. Rather, postcolonial theory can 
be described more as a perspective for situating knowledge within a holistic context.10 
Furthermore, postcolonialism should not be viewed as a homogeneous or monolithic 
intellectual activity as scholars working in this space have vastly different approaches and 
purposes. Postcolonial theory expands the scholarly vantage point by adding “the 
dissatisfaction of the Third World with its condition of existence…the challenge and 
rejection of Eurocentric narratives and exposure of what they misrepresent or erase.”11 
Postcolonial theory begins intellectually in the space of literary analysis along with the 
school of poststructuralism, which itself has extensive diversity. Both postcolonialism 
and poststructuralism offer critiques of IR particularly with respective to the violence of 
                                                 
10Charlotte Epstein, “The Postcolonial Perspective: An Introduction,” International Theory 6, no. 2 
(2014): 294–311. doi:10.1017/S1752971914000219. 
11Seifudein Adem, “Ali A. Mazrui, the Postcolonial Theorist,” African Studies Review, Volume 57, 
Number 1, (April 2014): 135-152 
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colonialism that is typically masked.12 Scholars of postcolonialism have thus consistently 
positioned their contributions toward the ‘global’ or the ‘international’ not merely the 
narrowly defined region or discipline in which they ostensibly work.  
In fact, many efforts to bridge the apparent divide between even postcolonial 
literary studies and IR have been considered. This literature often invokes the words of 
Philip Darby who claimed that “imaginative literature and analysis in international 
relations do not inhabit different worlds; they overlap and even intertwine — or at least 
they should.”13 Darby’s contribution to the integration of postcolonialism and IR goes 
further with his explicit calls for internationalizing the postcolonial movement. He 
identifies that postcolonial theory has high applicability and practical value for IR for 
recasting the global North/South division and recapturing the power of political 
movements.14 From here, we can move into how specific postcolonial scholarship has 
shaped intellectual discourse and its particular attention to South Asia global position. 
From a postcolonial perspective, India and Bangladesh dominate the scholarship 
on South Asia. These studies do however offer critical advancements applicable to 
Pakistan for our consideration of the nation-state in a postcolonial context. This 
intellectual space is particularly and appropriately tied to the work of the Subaltern 
Studies Collective, a grouping of scholars whose work on postcolonialism has sparked a 
                                                 
12Alina, Sajed, “The Post Always Rings Twice? The Algerian War, Poststructuralism and the Postcolonial 
in IR Theory.” Review of International Studies 38, no. 1 (2012): 141–63. 
doi:10.1017/S0260210510001567. 
13Philip Darby, The Fiction of Imperialism: Reading between International Relations and Postcolonialism, 
London: Cassel 1998.  
14Philip Darby, “Pursuing the Political: A Postcolonial Rethinking of Relations International,” Millenium: 
Journal of International Studies, Volume 33, Number 1 (2004): 1-34. 
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major transformation in the humanities and, to a degree, the social sciences since the 
1980s. Adopting the term “subaltern” from Antonio Gramsci, postcolonial scholars have 
used the term generally to refer to the marginalized and forgotten people of society and 
those specifically left out of historical narratives. However, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
whose article “Can the Subaltern Speak?” has establish dominant precedent for this topic, 
clarifies that ‘subaltern’ is not merely a substitute for the oppressed but rather indicative 
of persons and groups of people who have no (as opposed to limited) access to 
hegemonic centers of power or knowledge production.15 Thus, Spivak is, by definition, 
correct to conclude that the subaltern cannot speak as they are utterly excluded. Implicit 
to this concept is the diffused impact of state-power, of which the formal hierarchy 
affects life and livelihood in dramatic different ways for the state’s ostensible subjects 
and citizens.  
The Subaltern Studies Collective builds on Spivak’s intellectual work and 
expands this narrative of discourse against a hegemonic power by attempting to speak on 
behalf of the subaltern. This process includes alternative readings of history that more 
deeply investigate colonial sources to elucidate the decision-making of the excluded 
people and using unorthodox material such as literature to fill in historical gaps. These 
scholars, the so-called “subalternists”, have sufficient critics but they have had an 
unquestioning and likely lasting influence on historical analysis, which is most applicable 
                                                 
15Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. 
C. Nelson and L. Grossberg. Basingstoke: Macmillian Education, 1988.  
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for this project.16 For the purposes of this report, I will review the three leading 
contributors and founders of the Collective – Ranajit Guha, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and 
Partha Chatterjee.   
Ranajit Guha’s historical work focusing on India is seen by many as a starting 
point for the postcolonial study exemplified by the subalternists. Particularly in his book, 
Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, Guha illustrates a logic of 
consciousness within history for the marginalized by reading between the lines of official 
histories and documents spanning over one hundred years.17 Guha attempts to capture a 
mirror image of these colonial and imperial narratives to expose the rational of the 
peasant movements and uprisings that occur across the Indian subcontinent from the 18th 
century to 1900.  
A logic of peasant insurgency has historically been ignored in favor of views that 
lower class agitation is “spontaneous” or part of a grander conspiracy orchestrated 
outside the peasantry or merely as an extreme form of criminality. In lieu of this 
narrative, Guha is able to articulate peasant agency into a clear political voice and as a 
nascent movement to up-end the world’s power structure within a semi-feudal society 
under colonial rule. Insurgent peasants can be seen across this period of Indian history 
negating society’s dividing lines either from appropriation, destruction, or other 
subversive actions. A critical feature of Guha’s analysis is regularly comparing peasant 
insurgency in colonial India with similar uprisings in Europe. Guha’s examples range 
                                                 
16For a recent critique with ample evidence of the far-reaching impact of the Subaltern Studies Collective, 
see Vivek Chibber, Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital, 2013 
17Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997. 
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from the Medieval period to contemporary events predominantly in England, France, 
Germany, and Russia. While a comparison to Europe was not essential, it is a useful 
method to illustrate the common experience and response of the subaltern across the 
world. Overall, Guha’s framing of peasant insurgency as the “site for two rival cognitions 
to meet and define each other negatively” allows for a broadly applicable pattern for 
subaltern studies. 
In the scope of postcolonial studies, Elementary Aspects was fundamental in 
changing a paradigm that has been replicated about the spontaneity and emotion of the 
peasantry. But this project carries further weight particularly in the subcontinent, where 
colonial power had blithely dismissed the very existence of “history” in the region.18 
Instead, Guha lays a foundation for a greater degree of subaltern historical credibility. 
While eminently readable, Guha’s work is a challenge to normative thinking and 
textbook historiography of this region and time period. Critically, he is also able to 
demonstrate how this new paradigm provides a framework for continuing projects of 
understanding peasant movements and the subaltern beyond his spatial and temporal 
parameters including the present. This methodology of history expands the scope of 
subjects to bring forward and claim the agency of the subaltern in a decisive fashion. 
While Guha expresses his interest in the political process of turning over hierarchies in 
our own time, his framework is appropriately open-ended as his reader is compelled to 
look for deeper understanding rather than a teleological utopia.  
                                                 
18Karl Marx, “The Future Results of British Rule in India,” New York Daily Tribune, August 8, 1853. 
 11 
The second Subaltern Studies writer of note here is Dipesh Chakrabarty whose 
work Provincializing Europe adds an important global dynamic to the collective.19 
Chakrabarty’s study attempts to rethink two core elements of Europe’s claim to 
modernity – the teleological history (or “historicism”) supporting Europe’s ascent to 
power and the hegemonic capacity to dismiss non-European actions as non-political. For 
clarification, historicism in historical analysis establishes a normative mode of 
development where history, especially for a nation or a people group, occurs in a linear 
fashion and presumes the European experience is a model to follow. Within this 
establishment of European preeminence, Chakrabarty notes the importance of political 
power, which is withheld in name from peasant revolts (shown by Guha above) and from 
cultural elites in colonial structures who are not afforded such authority. The overall crux 
of Chakrabarty’s argument, like Archaya’s concept of Global IR, is not to dismiss 
European thought whole-sale but rather to acknowledge that Europe’s position is 
“indispensable and inadequate.” However, in this necessary but insufficient role, 
European thinkers, such as Marx, can be utilized by the Global South to adjust discourse 
on development and in turn reduce the pedestal placed under Europe’s experience. In 
doing so, Europe would be “provincialized” rather than universalized. Chakrabarty’s 
challenge to other scholars is ultimately to search out the plurality present in the world 
particularly through historical analysis that is not predestined by Europe’s past. 
                                                 
19Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000. 
 12 
 Finally, for this section, Partha Chatterjee’s work The Nation and its Fragments 
presents a postcolonial view of nationalism that both builds on and critiques Benedict 
Anderson’s ground-breaking work.20 In many ways, the “imagined community” that 
Anderson described as the basis for nationalism is very much alive in Chatterjee’s 
writing.21 The depth of Chatterjee’s analysis into the literary and cultural life of colonial 
Bengal is a testament to the intricacies on which national identity and community are 
based. However, like his Collective colleagues, Chatterjee pushes back against the 
presence of any homogenous theory. Instead, nationalism and national identity can be 
viewed as a multi-layered negotiation between members of a community, some more 
acceptable than others, and each with contested and overlapping narratives. Within this 
discourse, the scholar can identify “fragments” that disrupt the historicism of more linear 
nationalist narratives.  
 In conjunction with postcolonial scholars attempting bridge the discipline with IR, 
the Subaltern Studies Collective, as represented by Guha, Chakrabarty, and Chatterjee, 
offers a different perspective on the national and international. It is a methodology of 
analyzing history with an appreciation for what has previously been underrepresented and 
questioning the normative path one expects for individuals and states. In a postcolonial 
framework, these norms are not simply disregarded or dismissed. Rather, the expectations 
created by an imperial and colonial legacy can be challenged through the experience of 
                                                 
20Chatterjee, Partha. The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993.  
21Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, New 
York: Verso, 1983 
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the non-West and the anti-colonial aspirations contested within former colonial states. In 
this vein, we should turn to Pakistan specifically. 
PAKISTAN AS A CASE STUDY FOR INTEGRATING THEORIES 
 
In this intellectual space of postcolonialism and IR, I intend, in this report, to 
outline the development of the state of Pakistan from its early imaginings into its 
significant governing and territorial challenges. Pakistan is positioned ideally for such a 
case study – it exhibits fascinating questions for the classical international relations 
theorist with its critical geographical position between China, India, and the Middle East 
and ongoing domestic political tensions ranging from ethnic divisions and civil-military 
power-sharing struggles. Additionally, from a postcolonial perspective, Pakistan 
illustrates very clearly the mystique of statehood in the modern world. Born out of the 
dissolution of the British Dominion of India, Pakistan’s political founders articulated a 
rallying call for statehood not on the basis of ethnic or linguistic unity, but the common 
culture shared by Muslims in British Indian territory. The community was claimed to be a 
nation within a nation – a minority group with a powerful unifying identity and 
surrounded by the majority Hindu Indian population. This complicating factor of 
religious identity is all too easily dismissed and misrepresented without the nuance of 
postcolonial theory.  
Pakistan is, however, often neglected from both theoretical frameworks. 
Certainly, security professionals have developed certain interest in Pakistan’s geopolitical 
importance (typically colored by an exclusively Western and American point-of-view 
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however) but the current policy-maker leaning to simply label Pakistan a “failed state” is 
less than robust analysis. On the postcolonial scholarship side, while colonial Bengal has 
been a significant focus of the Subaltern Studies Collective, Pakistan has been featured in 
a limited capacity. This report will attempt to consider Pakistan’s history from a 
postcolonial perspective without the exclusive focus on American security goals in the 
region.  
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Chapter 3: Historical Origins and Imagining of Pakistan as a State 
(1940-1971) 
The following section provides an overview of Pakistan’s history as part of 
British India’s independence movement, the sequence and dynamics of state leadership in 
the central government, and the ultimate split between East and West Pakistan in 1971. 
Rather than an attempt at an exhaustive history, the chronological events here are 
intended to provide clarity for those unfamiliar with Pakistan’s early years and to provide 
context for the further content in this report.  
1940-1947: JINNAH AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE 
 
While the constructed narrative of Pakistan and the role of the Muslim community 
in India historically can, and does, go back in time for centuries, 1940 functions as a clear 
signpost for the early imagining of Pakistan. That year, the All-India Muslim League 
articulated their support for the, so-called, Two Nation Theory, which identified the 
Muslims of India as one of two nations within the British territory in the subcontinent. 
The party’s Lahore Resolution was a poignant line in the sand for political maneuvering 
between British India’s political elite, which had been occurring for decades. In light of 
the theoretical framing established above, it is important to note that the “imagined 
community” of Pakistan was at this point both a religious and a political project. The 
national identity of Pakistan has often been framed negatively at one end of that spectrum 
or, more conspiratorially in modern India, as an amalgam of both. In that understanding, 
which is colored heavily by Western suspicion of Muslim communities, there is 
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functionally no difference between a religious and a political motivation in the Muslim 
community.22  
However, with the intellectual guidance of postcolonialism, we must allow for a 
plurality of motivation in the formation of Pakistan. Surely some advocates conceived of 
the grand narrative of Pakistan in a spiritual manner that could be more exclusively 
characterized as “religious”. Of course, on the other hand, there were very legitimate 
socio-economic considerations to be made within a community characterized externally 
as homogenous in shared “Muslim-ness”. Political actions in a Eurocentric worldview 
have been decoupled from religious motivation (particularly when also linked with the 
working class or galvanizing the subaltern). However, this framework is based on 
assumptions of rational actions that are selective and singular rather than occurring 
simultaneously.23 It is simply factual to state that the historical claim for the nation of 
Pakistan is a religious narrative. That narrative, however, should not and did not subsume 
or negate the presence of both a highly sophisticated elite political campaign and a mass 
movement further motivated by the socio-economic disaffection felt in the colonial state. 
With regard to elite politics, it is inescapable in any discussion of the Partition and 
the founding of Pakistan to not heavily focus on the person of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. 
Known in Pakistan as the Qaid-i-Azam (Great Leader), Jinnah necessarily dominates any 
discussion of Pakistan’s origin story. Like Mohandas Gandhi, Jinnah was educated in 
London in British law and returned to British India with political goals and ambition. 
                                                 
22Iftikhar H. Malik, Islam, Nationalism and the West: Issues of Identity in Pakistan. London: Macmillian 
Press, 1999, 28. 
23Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe 
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Jinnah’s position within the broader narrative of Indian independence and legislative 
growth is an interesting personal story in its own right. His primary goal is believed to 
have been the establishment of an independent central Indian government with some 
form of confederation wherein Muslim constituencies had some protection or, ideally, 
parity with the non-Muslim majority. Much of Jinnah’s political activity prior to the more 
divisive period during wartime were seen as centrist as he walked a line between the 
Muslim League party, which he eventually led, and the secular Indian Congress party.24 It 
is however, during the complex dynamics of anti-colonial demands for independence 
coupled with the reality of world war, that Jinnah’s political conundrum emerges clearly. 
With a world war raging and Great Britain on its heels, the political structures of 
British India would undeniably change in the 1940s. The gradual ceding of legislative 
authority and creation of local assemblies would need to be structured toward new 
governing realities. First among those realities was the potential for an unprecedented 
unification of the subcontinent territory under its own rule. No previous governing entity 
in South Asian history could claim such territorial hegemony. Yet the colonial structure 
of British India was not built on unification but rather existing and created divisions. The 
British Raj was a patchwork of political structures interspersed with unconquered but 
tributary princely states including Muslim majority populations in the territories of 
Hyderabad and Kashmir and directly-administered Presidencies and provinces. The 
Muslim districts directly administered by the British - the Western frontier territories and 
the ethnically unified but religiously mixed Bengal in the East – who were explicitly open 
                                                 
24Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
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to the political opportunities Jinnah faced were generally more interested in provincial 
autonomy.25 For Ayesha Jalal, Jinnah’s fundamental challenge was balancing the 
competing interests of the Muslims dispersed in minority communities throughout India 
with those of Muslims who controlled territories by majority population. In addition, 
Jinnah’s characterization as politically ambitious is considered a major factor for his own 
goals of a Pakistan with credible weight in central government negotiations for intra-
national power sharing.  
In this context, Jalal’s analysis of Jinnah shows a political strategy that misread 
the varying positions of Muslims within British India, the willingness of the Indian 
National Congress to suffer some territorial loss, and the urgency for departure felt by the 
British government. First, Jinnah’s foundational goal to be recognized as the “sole 
spokesman” of India’s Muslims with parity alongside Congress at the central government 
depended on gaining legitimacy from the Muslim-majority provinces as well as winning 
separate Muslim electorate seats in provinces with a significant Muslim minority. This 
process was consistently counter-productive as minority Muslims in the United Provinces 
(UP) had little to be common political goals with Muslims in majority provinces such as 
Sindh or the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). 
A recent and extensive critique of Jalal’s work on Jinnah comes from Venkat 
Dhulipala. Fundamentally, Dhulipala questions both the overall vagueness of “Pakistan” 
that Jalal regularly identifies and the consideration that Pakistan was achieved either by 
                                                 
25Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman 
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accident or on the back of Jinnah’s ambition alone.26 Rather, “Pakistan was a symbol with 
substance” stemming from “debates in which political elites and the general public came 
together”.27 This reading of the historical narrative surrounding Pakistan is consistent 
with the postcolonial framework that has been discussed above regarding Subaltern 
Studies analysis of popular movements such as Guha’s work on peasants. Pakistan as a 
state was systematically articulated both on secular grounds and religious ones. These 
considerations even stretched immediately to the international sphere with assumptions 
that Pakistan could and would lead a new community of Islamic nation-states taking on 
the mantle lost by the Turks a few decades earlier.28 The imagining of the state of 
Pakistan was perhaps bold but no more irrational or accidental than any other state 
formation.  
In addition to Jalal and Dhulipala, the national origins of Pakistan have been 
extensively discussed by Faisal Devji in his work comparing Pakistan’s ideological 
founding with Jewish Zionism. Devji makes clear that by the 1940s “Muslim nationalists 
[had] rejected history, geography and even demography as the foundations of their 
political life, opting instead for an abstract idea of belonging together.”29 This rejection of 
the traditional criteria that have been associated with the nation-state emerged from a 
plurality of subject/citizen experience under the imperial structure. The logic of 
majority/minority populations and the logic of empire are essentially at diametric odds. 
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As such the founders of Pakistan display significant logical inconsistencies for Devji and 
while articulating a “world-historical” framework for Islam as the basis of Pakistan, they 
ultimately belittle Islam’s position by nationalizing it.30 Devji’s work exemplifies the 
internationalizing thrust of postcolonialism and presents Pakistan’s creation as religious 
and political without needing to conflate the two like its original proponents.  
1947-1958: NEGOTIATING STATEHOOD 
 
Pakistan’s early establishment as a state was dominated by continuing British 
influence, the perception of an existential threat from now sovereign India, and unstable 
civilian leadership. In a serious blow to Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah died in 1948 
leaving a significant vacuum at the top of the country’s power structure. Many leaders of 
the Muslim League were in fact from feudal or semi-feudal backgrounds and lacked the 
political and educational caliber that Jinnah had displayed.31 Jinnah’s deputy Liaquat Ali 
Khan assumed primary leadership of the country and the Muslim League party 
organization. Despite weaknesses within the Muslim League’s leadership and structure, 
no notable opposition or clear rallying force emerged. Certainly, that reality was 
somewhat forced as political parties deemed too subversive such as the Communist Party 
of Pakistan were banned in 1954.32 Under Khan’s prime ministerial leadership, the state 
of Pakistan initiated the drafting of a constitution particularly following India’s 
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constitutional ratification in 1950. However, Liaquat Ali Khan also prioritized party 
politics creating tension between the central government and Pakistan’s provinces, which 
continued to view some degree of autonomy as the ideal.33   
Until the eventual ratification of a Pakistani constitution in 1956, Pakistan 
technically remained a dominion of the British Commonwealth under the authority of a 
Governor-General. This position was first held by Muhammed Ali Jinnah and would later 
transition into the role of President of Pakistan under the constitutional authority, which 
formally established the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The former British Viceroy of 
India, Lord Mountbatten, accepted the counterpart Governor-Generalship under the new 
government of the Indian Union. In the view of Jinnah’s personal representative, F.K 
Noon, this action by Lord Mountbatten was a further complication in the British role and 
relationship with India and Pakistan respectively.34 Mountbatten served as the President 
of a joint Defense Council but could clearly be seen here as no longer unbiased.  
In addition to the unprecedented level of localized violence that occurred during 
the Partition, the new states almost immediately initiated war over an ambiguous border. 
The British system of governing the Indian territory relied on division and the uncertain 
status of territory following official independence derived from this fact. In addition to 
the on-going contemporary issue of control over Jammu & Kashmir, the small Muslim-
ruled state of Junagadh near Pakistan’s coastal border with India proved to be a flashpoint 
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as well. Pressure from India (including occupying troops) resulted in the Nawab of 
Junagadh fleeing for Karachi.35 Subsequently, the Hindu population overwhelming voted 
for accession to India.36 Kashmir, however, demonstrated more dramatically the very real 
capacity for open war between the two new states. The narrative of Kashmir is now well-
established as thousands of armed tribesmen backed by the state of Pakistan moved into 
the valley of Kashmir to force the Hindu ruler to join his Muslim population with 
Pakistan.37 In response, the Maharaja acceded to India and the Indian military protected 
the capital city of Srinagar at roughly the modern-day Line of Control. From its origins to 
today, Kashmir remains the defining feature of Pakistan’s state concern that India seeks 
to destabilize and ultimately destroy their sovereignty.  
In addition to the external threat and structural uncertainty in the country, 
Pakistan’s leadership began to take the country down a new governance trajectory in this 
period. Under the Governor-Generalship of Ghulam Mohammed (1951) followed by 
Iskander Mirza (1955), the state of Pakistan was guided toward “the ascendency of the 
bureaucracy, bolstered by the military from the background.”38 In the context of limited 
political organizing, a tendency toward authoritarianism, such as military dictatorship, 
was exposed within the bureaucratic system of Pakistan. The persistent threat and 
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actuality of war in the early years of Pakistan’s history further explain Pakistan’s affinity 
to military leadership. Thus, as President in 1958 (as the position of Governor-General 
had been replaced), Iskander Mirza elevated General Ayub Khan to a new position of 
“Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan and Chief Martial Law 
Administrator”, which violated the existing constitution of Pakistan.39 
1958-1971: CHALLENGES OF GOVERNANCE 
 
Pakistan’s troubled history with democratic governance and civil-military 
tensions demonstrates the competing views of domestic players on statehood and national 
interests. After only two years in effect, the Pakistani constitution was rendered void and 
national leadership came to Army General Ayub Khan. Ayub Khan took on the role of 
president (after ousting Iskander Mirza) and initiated guidance for the establishment of a 
new form of governance in Pakistan. This second constitution in 1962 emphasized the 
executive role of the President of Pakistan along with a national assembly. Ayub Khan 
particularly supported a concept of “basic democracy” within a context of believing 
Pakistan was unprepared for a fuller parliamentary democracy.40 Basic democracy 
fundamentally followed traditional hierarchal patterns with village and district councils 
wherein the lower level chairmen were automatically part of the higher council. This 
ultimately created a functional body of “electors” to appoint the president and members 
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of the assembly. Ayub Khan’s government also delineated the “units” of Pakistan – West 
and East (modern-day Bangladesh) – as equal entities. 
Pakistan under Ayub Khan, and throughout the period running up to Pakistan’s 
division in 1971, represents a critical historical moment of redefining Islam’s role in the 
state. In particular, the conflation of the military with Islamic virtues is particularly 
telling for the modern-day observer of Pakistan.41 Ayub Khan’s paternalistic approach to 
governance required holding up the military as an exemplar to society - for their 
discipline and order as well as their proficiency in defending both Islam and the state. 
The process of “Islamization” in Pakistan in this period would, however, not be overly 
parallel to more fundamentalist theological approaches in the modern-day. Rather, Ayub 
Khan envisioned a modern Muslim state that could meet the contemporary challenges 
and realities faithfully – he was more concerned with law and order than theological 
nuance. In a postcolonial framework, this governance style shows how Western 
expectations about the compatibility of democracy with Muslim communities became 
internalized and how the allure of “modern” order can facilitate an authoritarian’s 
legitimacy. 
Throughout this period, East Pakistan’s position and credibility gradually eroded. 
While the administrative unit was technically granted legislative parity with the Western 
half, it was consistently disadvantaged within the national structure. Ayub Khan took 
great strides to promote economic development in Pakistan during his regime but 
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disparity in the usage of central government resources between East and West was highly 
apparent.42 Additionally, in a manner reminiscent of the colonial structure it followed, 
civil administrators and bureaucrats in East Pakistan were dispatched from the West.43 
Most severe however, was the approach to Pakistani nationalism that ostracized the 
Bengali population of East Pakistan as insufficiently Muslim. Adopting normative 
narratives from the colonial period, Ayub Khan’s government considered Bengals overly 
Hindu and less martial than their Punjabi or Pathan counterparts in the West.44 In 
addition, Bengali food and language were considered less associated with Islam’s Arab 
origins. Bengalis were also believed to be more susceptible to left-wing political activity, 
which was viewed as incompatible with Islam. As a process of legitimizing the state, 
Ayub Khan’s strategy required an “other” to denigrate while revising the history of South 
Asia to imply a long-standing national identity of Pakistan found in the earliest Muslim 
arrivals to the region.  
Ayub Khan’s regime lasted until 1969, surviving a war with India in 1965, and 
significantly eroded intra-Pakistani unity while creating an unrealistic narrative of 
Pakistan’s national ideals. While political dissatisfaction was rampant in East Pakistan as 
their participation in the central government was sidelined, West Pakistan also chafed 
under the undemocratic system. Unrest across the country and demands for new elections 
convinced Ayub Khan to establish martial law as the only remaining means to govern an 
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unruly population.45 However, a bout of sickness that left him briefly incapacitated and 
growing disillusionment from his cabinet led to a bloodless coup. Army General Yahya 
Khan took his place as the new martial law administrator promising new elections. The 
return of a real election to Pakistan demonstrated just how unstable the East-West 
dynamic of Pakistan had become.  
After the Awami League from East Pakistan gained an electoral majority, Yahya 
Khan refused to establish the national assembly. While the Eastern province rioted in 
response, Pakistani soldiers were mobilized to unleash terror and violence on Bengali 
civilians. Ultimately, after India’s military intervention and the ignoble surrender of over 
90,000 Pakistani troops, Bangladesh declared independence.46 Both modern Pakistan and 
Bangladesh retain and repress the traumatic memories of 1971.47 The image of a moral 
virtuous Islamic state had been shattered. West Pakistan continued forward under the 
civilian leadership of Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto, whose political party had won the majority of 
votes in what remained of the country. This historical overview concludes at this point in 
time but the cycle of military intervention and contentious elections has been Pakistan’s 
norm into the present.  
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Chapter 4: State-power through Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy 
The development of state-power is typically constituted through government 
institutions and emerging from a structure of colonial bureaucratic authority, Pakistan’s 
state-power was demonstrated through centralized bureaucracy. In order to view the 
domestic establishment of government entities both from a postcolonial perspective and 
as applicable to IR, this section of the report will discuss the specific emergence of the 
Pakistani Foreign Service and the effort to establish state legitimacy within the 
international system.  
THE FORMATION OF THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN SERVICE 
 
The pre-independence Indian Civil Service only began accepting local candidates 
for the Political Service (focused on the international relations between the British Raj 
and India’s Princely States) in the late 1930s.48 By the time of Partition in 1947, there 
were thus limited numbers of these proto-diplomats available for the new bureaucracies 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the new countries. Pakistan was somewhat slower 
than India in transitioning to an independent Foreign Service though record of the 
transition of power illustrates that chaos abounded. Phillips Talbot, an American observer 
in the period, describes the “bifurcation in 70 days of this government of 400 million 
people” and the division of even the most mundane of office supplies created logistical 
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nightmares.49 The division of personnel was only more hectic and fraught with political 
challenges.  
Until 1960, British nationals remained in the broadly defined bureaucracy of the 
Civil Service of Pakistan and many replacements were elite migrants into Pakistan rather 
than locals of the provinces themselves. 50 One such migrant to Pakistan (from Agra in 
today’s Indian state of Uttar Pradesh), Samiullah Koreshi, an eventual ambassador for 
Pakistan, details in his memoir joining the Pakistani Foreign Service in 1949.51 Following 
the British colonial system that India also maintains, the Pakistani Foreign Service pulled 
top candidates from the wider civil service examination. Another early entrant and 
eventual ambassador was Iqbal Akhund, who like Koreshi had completed the entrance 
process for a provincial level civil service position before being called to international 
duty the same year.52 Akhund and Koreshi highlight two paths for developing expertise in 
a colonial-style bureaucracy as the former studied diplomacy with US and UK 
counterparts as well as French in Paris while the later completed formal graduate study at 
Tufts University. Not until 1981 did Pakistan establish its own Foreign Service Academy 
for diplomatic training.53  
Pakistan, at this stage, faced a particular bureaucratic challenge of a non-
contiguous state. East and West Pakistan, of course, were separated by thousands of miles 
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of Indian territory. Koreshi notes the low representation of Bengalis in the “superior” 
civil services, which included the top domestic authorities within East Bengal and the 
Foreign Service. Rather than attempting credible solutions to this challenge, which would 
become a serious grievance and not just a logistical problem, Pakistan’s government 
continually emphasized the West. The language, appearance and culture of the West 
dominated the internal and external presentation of the nation’s legitimacy.  
At the early stage of Pakistan’s foreign service, the top leadership of the country 
was invested in the budding agency. Koreshi describes a visit by Prime Minister Liaquat 
Ali Khan and his wife to Tufts University as they personally checked in on the small 
handful of Pakistani students there to advance the country’s capacity. Liaquat Ali Khan’s 
wife even served as Ambassador in The Hague where Iqbal Akhund notes the “privilege 
of serving” her. In India, the first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru took a similar 
command and interest in foreign affairs demonstrating a keen understanding across the 
South Asian region of the credibility that comes in the international system from robust 
diplomatic presence.54 Even prior to the formal establishment of Pakistan, British Foreign 
Office officials note meeting with leading members of the Muslim League who were 
already discussing Pakistan’s international representation. Months before independence, 
the British were notified of that Pakistan would “need its own representatives in foreign 
capitals” and were “disinclined to share a United Kingdom High Commissioner with 
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Hindustan.”55 Muslims in South Asia had observed the lessons of the international system 
from the British closely and now Pakistan would compete at the West’s own game. 
PAKISTAN’S EARLY FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Pakistan’s demands for charting its own course in the international system is 
somewhat undercut by the foreign policy the country displayed between 1947 and 1971. 
Muhammed Ali Jinnah demonstrated a strong interest in adding American political and 
economic investment to continued relationship with the UK.56 On one hand, we can read 
this movement as a rational decision in an IR framework wherein a weak state seeks a 
stronger benefactor. And from a postcolonial perspective, Muslim leaders in British India 
had advocated for support of the colonial state as a means for socio-economic advantages 
and this internalized dynamic of Western superiority manifested in Pakistan’s foreign 
policy. In either reading, Pakistan’s leaders have consistently assumed that a great power 
will bolster their position. Clearly, the United States has provided this role including in 
the period discussed herein. However, Pakistan has always been underwhelmed by the 
aid and support offered from the United States given a belief in its position as a “pivot of 
the world.”57  
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 Pakistan’s early foray into the international system suggests an approach based on 
flawed assumptions. First, Pakistan’s leaders expected to be a highly desired partner in 
the on-going global tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. This turned 
out to be only partially true and to a much lesser extent than what been hoped. Second, a 
vision of pan-Islam guided efforts to reach out to other Muslim-majority counties. Egypt, 
Turkey, and Indonesia were viewed as the most favored partners initially. The emphasis 
on religious commonality however was delivered at a moment in time when anti-
imperialism, not religiosity, was the prevailing force in the postcolonial states. Turkey’s 
Ataturk-inspired leaders were committed to a secularist state and were turned off by the 
emphatic presentation of Muslim unity from Pakistan’s representatives.58 President 
Nasser of Egypt and President Sukarno of Indonesia saw greater international opportunity 
in partnership with India particularly with the stable hand of Jawaharlal Nehru in 
command.59 Together at the Bandung Conference in 1955, their erstwhile efforts for unity 
among former colonial states was an international objective superseding Pakistan’s offer. 
Though Pakistan participated in such multilateral organizations, bilateral relationships on 
the basis of religion alone were left wanting. 
 Like foreign policy in every country, Pakistan’s position in the international 
system was linked to its domestic realities. Of particular relevance, the Pakistani state 
maintained a disdainful attitude toward communism and yet found a formidable ally in 
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the newly established Communist state of China.60 The Communist Party of Pakistan was 
never particularly well-organized and after being banned from political activity, CPP 
leaders were efficiently imprisoned, tortured, and executed by both civilian and military 
governments.61 After the CPP, both the Awami League and the People’s Party of 
Pakistan (PPP), who won majorities in East and West Pakistan respectively in the 
contested 1970 elections, invoked leftist political rhetoric that was viewed as highly 
destabilizing by the central military authority. And yet, Pakistan became a firm friend 
with China in an example of international opportunism despite its lofty ideals about Islam 
and governance. Pakistan’s reliance on states with greater international power has been a 
two-sided game between the United States and China since the beginning. In both cases, 
survival against India and the maintenance of order at home appears to be the objective.  
 Within this cursory view of Pakistan’s early foreign policy, we can find threads of 
the colonial legacy intact. Colonial methods of administrative and the militarism extolled 
among the ethnic communities that became Pakistan dominate the national identity. This 
extended outward in the form of primarily seeking allies who could offer military support 
despite desperate needs elsewhere in society. Like many countries in the so-called Third 
World, Pakistan accepted the narrative of centralized state control and sought out like-
minded partners. Pakistan’s foreign policy in this period is characterized by muddling 
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along trying to participate in an international system that had been constructed on the 
exclusion of non-Western people for centuries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The social and political experience of Pakistan over the thirty years described here 
can demonstrate the need for postcolonialism with IR theory. Without recognizing the 
cost of colonialism, scholars of international studies can fail to understand the 
motivations and perspectives of much of the world. Further, scholarly work that informs 
government action can mislead through misperception and cause untold ripple effects in 
the international system. Global assumptions about modern development and national 
capacity can also be challenged with a historical perspective that acknowledges that 
European development through imperialism and colonialism cannot be the norm. 
Pakistan’s emergence as a state and the series of domestic and international decisions 
made by its government can be considered deeply flawed, even tragic. But in addition to 
specific failings of leaders or movements, the context of Pakistan’s existence as a state 
was conditioned on a global system of exploitation and an intellectual structure conceived 
in Western superiority. In the spirit of plurality advocated by a postcolonial framework, 
Pakistan can be an example both of the systematic barriers in the international system for 
postcolonial states and an important case-study for national self-sabotage.   
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